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Recent Developments 
FITZGERALD v. STATE: 
A Drug-Dog Sniff of Exterior Portions of a Residence Does Not 
Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution 
By: Lindsay Victoria Ruth Moss 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a drug-dog sniff of exterior portions of a residence does not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 487, 864 A.2d 1006, 
1007 (2004). The Court declined to revisit whether Article 26 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights contains an exclusionary rule separate 
from the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. !d. at 509, 864 
A.2d at 1020. 
In February 2002, Detective Leeza Grim ("Grim") of the 
Howard County Police Department ("HCPD") learned that petitioner 
Matthew Thomas Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") and his girlfriend, Allison 
Mancini ("Mancini"), were selling high grade marijuana. Grim made 
arrangements with Officer Larry Brian ("Brian") of HCPD's K-9 Unit 
to visit Fitzgerald's apartment building with his drug-detecting dog, 
Alex. The apartment building was accessible to the public through 
unlocked glass doors. Brian and Alex performed a scan of all four 
apartment doors in the building, and Alex twice indicated the presence 
of narcotics outside of Fitzgerald's residence. After obtaining a search 
and seizure warrant, Grim seized substantial amounts of marijuana 
from the apartment. Fitzgerald and Mancini were arrested and charged 
with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, among other 
offenses. 
Fitzgerald filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search and seizure warrant in the Circuit Court of 
Howard County, claiming the dog sniff of his apartment constituted a 
warrantless search. The motion was denied based on past decisions 
holding that dog sniffs of public places were not searches under the 
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald was found guilty, and the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted 
certiorari in order to evaluate whether the dog sniff constituted a 
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search under the Fourth Amendment or Article 26, and if so, if it was 
lawful. 
The Court relied on two Supreme Court cases in determining 
that a warrantless dog sniff is constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 490-492, 884 A.2d at 1009-1011. 
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), the Supreme 
Court held that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment because "the manner in which information is obtained 
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a 
typical search." ld. at 491, 884 A.2d at 1010. 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that the 
decision in Place was to be applied as a general categorization, rather 
than a narrow holding applying only to dog searches of airplane 
luggage. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 491, 884 A.2d at 1010. Specifically, 
United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 123, affirmed the Place 
holding, relying on the reasoning of the limited scope of dog sniffs, 
and finding that the test "does not compromise any legitimate interest 
in privacy." Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 492, 884 A.2d at 1011. 
Place and Jacobson establish the current standard regarding 
dog sniffs, namely, that a sniff is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment because it is used in a narrow scope like drug detection 
and because it is conducted in government authorized locations, such 
as a public place. /d. at 493, 884 A.2d at 1011. A "crucial 
component.. .is the focus on the scope and nature of the sniff... rather 
than on the object sniffed, in determining whether a legitimate privacy 
interest exists." !d. A dog sniff is narrow in scope because it does not 
involve an intrusion and no non-contraband items are revealed. /d. at 
494, 884 A.2d at 1011-12. 
The Court of Appeals found that Maryland has applied this 
precedent in Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 581, 774 A.2d 420, 436 
(200 1 ), holding that a dog sniff of a car is a not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012. 
The Court stated that a dog sniff alone does not constitute an intrusive 
search, and found Place to be "applicable to dog sniffs in general, 
independent of the object searched, because of the sniffs narrow 
scope." /d. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012 (quoting Wilkes, 364 Md. 544, 
581, 774 A.2d 420). 
The instant case is one of first impression in Maryland because 
the Court . has not ruled on the constitutionality of a dog sniff 
performed on the outside of a residence. /d. at 495, 884 A.2d at 1012. 
The Court rejected Fitzgerald's argument that the outside of a 
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residence should be differentiated from other dog sniffs because this 
type of search "intrudes upon the privacy of the home," and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. !d. at 496, 
884 A.2d at 1013. The Court concluded that the cases he relied upon, 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001), are not relevant to the dog sniff doctrine. 
Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 496, 884 A.2d at 1013. The Court determined 
that, in Karo, the broad utility of an electronic beeper used to monitor 
a can of ether, the intent to detect non-contraband material, and the 
electronic aspect were all important factors that distinguished those 
facts from the present case. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 497, 884 A.2d at 
1013-14. 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal 
imaging to detect heat inside a residence for the purpose of 
establishing the presence of marijuana constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 498, 884 A.2d at 1014. 
Fitzgerald claims that the "general public use" standard elaborated in 
Kyllo should also apply to dog sniffs. Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 499, 884 
A.2d at 1014-1015. This standard relates to information obtained from 
the interior of a home through the use of sense-enhancing technology 
that could not have otherwise been obtained without a physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. !d. at 499, 844 A.2d at 
1014. The Court of Appeals saw no connection between thermal 
imaging technology and dog sniffs, stating that "a dog is not 
technology-- he or she is a dog." !d. at 500, 884 A.2d at 1015. The 
Court further explained that a dog is not an advancing technology 
because dogs have achieved all limitations and advances, in 
comparison to technology, which is forever advancing. !d. at 501, 884 
A.2d at 1016. 
Lastly, the Court rejected the argument that dog sniffs have the 
potential for revealing intimate details of one's home, unlike thermal 
imaging, reasoning that "[a] person does not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in contraband, but does in bath water." !d. at 
501, 884 A.2d at 1016. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that a 
dog sniff of the exterior of a residence was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, provided that the dog and police are lawfully 
present at the site of the sniff. !d. at 503-504, 884 A.2d at 1017. 
The Court next addressed the argument that even if a dog sniff 
was considered a non-search under the Fourth Amendment, it would 
constitute a search under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. !d. at 506, 884 A.2d at 1019. Article 26 provides that "all 
157 
warrants, without oath or affirmation ... to search suspected places ... 
are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search 
suspected places . . . without naming or describing the place . . . are 
illegal, and ought not to be granted." /d. Fitzgerald supports his 
argument by noting that Article 26 "was designed to protect the 
sanctity of the home, thus, creating stronger protection than the Fourth 
Amendment for sniffs outside a residence." /d. at 507, 884 A.2d at 
1019. 
The Court found that Maryland is notably absent from the 
current trend of states adopting exclusionary rules for their state 
constitutions. /d. at 508, 884 A.2d at 1020. Maryland currently 
construes Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. /d. 
at 508, 884 A.2d at 1020. The Court saw no need to revisit whether 
Article 26 contains an exclusionary rule, because even if it accepted 
Fitzgerald's argument that a dog sniff did constitute a search, the sniff 
would remain valid under a reasonable suspicion standard, which is 
adopted by the majority of state constitutions. /d. at 511, 884 A.2d at 
1022. Provided that the police had a reasonable suspicion that a 
residence contained illegal contraband, the validity of the dog sniff 
would be upheld. /d. at 510, 884 A.2d at 1021. 
In Fitzgerald v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
broadened the validity of dog sniffs, when used to detect illegal 
contraband, to include exterior portions of residences accessible to the 
public. This ruling will have far reaching consequences, giving greater 
protection to places of residence that are in gated or secured 
communities. It may also be interpreted as giving greater protections 
under the law to individuals that can afford to reside in wealthier 
communities that are less accessible to the general public. 
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